As the Aviation Projects Manager at the Center of Excellence, I get to see a wide array of great ideas and technologies; most of which will never see the light of day in Aerial Firefighting (AFF). Aviation in general has a high-barrier to entry for new ideas, enforced through high-costs, with roots in life-safety, but that’s not what causes Industry failure.
Most ideas and technologies that fail in AFF do so because it wasn’t targeted at solving an actual problem. At the CoE, we analyze some of this technology using a simple metric, “Rate of Suppression must be equal to or greater than the Rate of Spread.” Increasing the amount of suppression available in one drop is a Denied Environment, so an idea or tech needs to place AFF in a position to use that given amount of suppression more effectively. If the tech or idea doesn’t make AFF more efficient/effective, it doesn’t actually solve anything. This article is an effort to define those environments that affect Aerial Firefighting advancement, and give Industry an “enemy to target” or frame problems in AFF to solve.
The current paradigm Aerial Firefighting finds itself in can be defined collectively as the Denied Environment. For discussion purposes, we’ll group supporting conditions together to form a Denied Environment triangle. AFF is prevented from interacting with fire located inside the Denied Environment.
Aerial Firefighting is denied entry to environments in three general areas; the “intangibles” of Time and Resource Denial, the Degraded Visual Environment (DVE), and the “tangibles” of Technology and the Physical world. Since AFF is denied occupation, they can’t attack fire there, and wildfire is allowed to go wild!
Time/Resource Denial
Time– AFF currently only operates on fire for about 1/3 of the day; we currently occupy only 1/3 of the Operational Clock (OPS-Clock). This means that the Aviation window is about 8 hours in a 24 hour OPS-Clock. This results in Aviation being denied 2/3 of the OPS-Clock.
Night hours make up a large chunk of the 2/3 OPS-Clock. Unlike Military Aviation, AFF does not “own the night.” They also typically can’t “attack an enemy when it’s at its weakest” or attack the fire when the winds are typically calmer, and the temperatures are cooler, as occurs at night.
Resource– Aerial Firefighting assets are limited and interdependent on others for success. AFF requires maintenance support, pilots, specialized logistics, and is expensive enough to warrant being judicious in doling out AFF as a resource. There are only so many qualified resources to go around, so access to AFF resources; aircraft, Long-Term Retardant, Water Enhancers, are included in this Denied Environment.
One could operate two bomber crews if they were available, but they’re interdependent on other aviation for operations, and require an Air Attack platform with a qualified Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) on board. Aviation is not risk-free and requires a high level of Command and Control (C2) and safety oversight by Subject Matter Experts. These “ancillaries” required for AFF are included in this Denied Environment.
Degraded Visual Environment (DVE)
This environmental area has its origins in Brown-Out/White-Out landing techniques used in helicopter landings to unimproved surfaces. They are grouped together and collectively known as the Degraded Visual Environment because the techniques to overcome the lack of visual cues during landings in these environments are similar.
Smoke– Due to smoke in the case of a Wildland Fire, manned aviation is denied operational time inside the smoke for safety reasons. Unmanned systems may not be denied access in the near future, but until reliable synthetic pilot vision becomes reality, this environment is denied to manned Aerial Firefighting.
Night– Night operations are higher-risk, not often conducted, and not universally accepted across platforms. Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) are amazing technology but have limitations. They amplify ambient light sources up to 1,000 times brighter, and this makes flame prohibitively bright for Pilots. It washes out the entire image in the NVG’s Field-of-View, and with the inherent inability to see smaller obstacles like wires, it’s a constant “risk versus reward” balance.
Technology/Physics Denial
These environments I like to think of as the tangibles, but a more appropriate title may be Technology Deprived and/or Physical World Denied.
Technology– Technology can be a denied environment for a variety of reasons. Either it isn’t available, hasn’t been invented yet, isn’t fully functional when needed, or results aren’t presented in a meaningful way. For AFF, proposed ideas and technology must address all these sub-sections to change outcomes.
Physics– The Physical World, or more to the point, the Laws that govern that world we learn in Physics, is a Denied Environment. It’s all the Laws science hasn’t found an exclusion for, yet. Physical laws like Aerodynamics that limit lift, which in turn limit carrying capacity of an AFF asset. The amount of water or Long-Term Retardant you can bring to bear in a single aircraft load, and the amount of potential energy that load is limited too.
The Physical World also includes wind; a major factor that AFF must contend with on every drop. There’s an art to counteracting wind effects on a dropped load of water or retardant. Not only does wind drift have to be accounted for accuracy, that is often accomplished through the Mark-1 Eyeball Aiming Device, which has proven to have varying margins of error. After a load is released, the Laws of Evaporation and Dissipation are applied to the load as it falls through the air. If a higher Minimum Safe Altitude is required, another Denied Environment, the amount of time air has to affect the drop. All of these environments are currently denied to AFF, and in many cases because the science doesn’t yet exist to defeat the “law.”
Why should Aerial Firefighting strive to Occupy Denied Environments?
To save human life may be the best reason; admittedly I don’t have all the answers. I do know that AFF will be asked to try again; so I analyze technology and ideas that will help AFF safely occupy these environments with more detail. It’s not a complete list, but some potential reasons to try are:
To Attack Fire on YOUR Terms.
The first reason or case for occupying the denied environment could be for Offensive Action! Using AFF to gain a tactical advantage to promote an overall strategy. AFF occupies a Denied Environment, when the fire is less intense. This allows AFF the ability to fight the fire on YOUR terms, and actually make headway. This could mean attacking at night when cooler temps and calmer winds “weaken the enemy” and give Ground Teams a Tactical Advantage in the next operational period.
For a Risk-analyzed Tactical Reason.
Whether executing an Emergency Action Plan, or reacting to a developing dangerous situation, there may be a reason to occupy the Denied Environment. It could be an “Alamo” event in a Wind Driven Fire; a place where you have to make a last stand or the fire outcome will be devastating. It could be to save a life, or to prevent a catastrophic Oil & Gas Explosion, but there will be a reason for AFF to occupy a denied environment one day.
To Apply a Knock-out Blow.
In Combat Operations, there exists what’s known as a Culmination Point. It’s the point in the battle when and where further operations will overextend an attacking force, and beyond which, further effort only produces waste.
This can similarly occur in Wildland Fire. For example, Aerial Firefighters conduct Indirect Attacks with Long-term Retardant (LTR) all day, in an attempt to steer the fire into a place where it can be knocked-out by Ground Forces. Incident Commanders (ICs) may be aware they will lose their AFF assets on a higher priority fire during the next Operational Period, and may choose to save an AFF asset to occupy a Denied Environment for a valid plan. To end the First Operational Period, the IC can use the saved AFF to force a Culmination Point, deliver a knock-out blow when the fire can least afford to take a hit, and give initiative back to Ground Forces for the next Operational Period.
To provide Ground Forces Reaction Time and Maneuver Space.
Yes, you read that correctly, my Cavalry Officer is showing I know. But this reason is applicable to Wildland Fire too, it’s just rarely framed this way. It’s applicable because Ground Teams, affectionately known here as “Boots on the Ground,” are the ones that truly put out a fire. AFF is there to support that operation; just like the Cavalry, it’s a Combined Arms, Air-Ground Integrated effort, that requires the Ground Teams to occupy for mission accomplishment.
Fire starts small, and when detection occurs, decisions are made. Right, wrong, or indifferent, the decision to leave a fire alone has at times led to our larger, more damaging Wildland Fires Nationwide. If ignition occurs after an early evening lightning storm for example, chances are no Boots on the Ground will be dispatched until morning, when they can travel to the remote location safer in daylight conditions. The speed of that Rapid Initial Attack is predicated on detection of the fire in the first place, and often that’s done from the air by AFF to begin with. Meanwhile, the fire burns unattended all night and grows, potentially out of control of the first arriving resources.
The problem is the Boots don’t know they’re truly outmatched until they arrive on scene and assess. They’re already “behind the power curve” in requesting additional resources at this point. AFF could apply the first Principal of Reconnaissance; Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact, even if it means occupying the denied night environment. In turn, they could provide the Boots with a Fundamental of Security; Provide the maneuvering body with reaction time and maneuver space.
Some Parting Thoughts…
Odds are the need for Aerial Firefighting to Occupy a Denied Environment will most likely arise during Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) Operations, and stakes will be high then. Operations in the WUI are not an acceptable time to test new technologies, but it’s contributed to an implementation gap for AFF.
This gap has produced the “best Aerial Firefighting the 90’s could supply” and created some denied environment in the process. It’s also the very depiction of where Industry’s ideas and technology for AFF find themselves.
At the CoE, we can test for data, but Industry usually has done that type of testing before we see it. We can test viability in a controlled environment, but that only shows the promise of the tech for AFF use. Industry’s ideas and technology to pull AFF into the 21st Century, require “Operational Repetitions” to reach Implementation. AFF needs to use Industry’s technology in a Permissive Environment, and provide Industry feedback. This allows Industry to refine their product, provides AFF familiarity with the technology in a less consequential environment, and allows learning for all to take place in a safe, realistic environment. Only through Operational Reps can Industry truly refine their technology, and give Aerial Firefighting what they need to occupy Denied Environments.
About the Author:
LTC (Ret) Tony Somogyi is the Aviation Projects Manager at the Center of Excellence for Advanced Technology Aerial Firefighting. Tony joined the CoE in 2025 after a Helicopter EMS Pilot career with CareFlight of the Rockies. He’s a Master Army Aviator, former Army Instructor and Maintenance Test Pilot, and former Commander of the Army’s High-altitude Aviation Training Site (HAATS) in Colorado.
